1.2. The finding
The law of marginal utility needs exactly one praxeological claim, and that claim is not about action.
It is about what the man would do. For each string of horses he might have, which wants would he serve? That is a plan, not a choice he makes.
Rothbard's own premise packs two claims into one sentence: that a man acts with the means he has, and that the wants he serves are "the most urgent of the not yet satisfied wants" (MES p. 24). Only the second does any work here. And it does that work in the subjunctive â exactly as his own argument does, when it sets six horses beside five and asks which want "the larger stock would have satisfied" (p. 25). No single real act can answer that.
The subjunctive by itself is not the trouble, and it is worth saying why, because it is the obvious complaint and it fails. Reasoning about stocks the man does not hold is Rothbard's own practice. He builds the law upward from one horse to two to three, he takes it downward from six to five, and he says outright that holding none of a good "does not affect the principle" (p. 32). What he refuses on p. 33 is something else â a scale for a wholly different endowment, (3X, 4Y, 2Z) against (6X, 8Y, 5Z) â while inside the stock the man actually has he allows "adding and subtracting from stock". That line is drawn around the stock in hand, not at some distance from it, and stepping one unit at a time, as he does, reaches every smaller string of horses there is. The formal claim reaches no further than he does.
The trouble is the tense. His restriction is that "value scales do not exist in a void apart from the concrete choices of action", and that "there is no need for him to formulate hypothetical value scales" (p. 33). His man needs no scale in advance: it shows up choice by concrete choice, as each one is made. The plan is a single standing object â every string of horses answered at once, before any of the choosing. That is precisely the scale in advance that Rothbard says is not needed. The complaint is not that we asked what he would do with five horses; it is that we gave him a settled answer for all of them at once, and no act of his settles it.
He saw a difficulty here, and exempted this law from the restriction by name. On that same page, in a subordinate clause with no argument attached: no one can predict the course of a man's choices "except that they will follow the law of marginal utility, which was deduced from the axiom of action". So the one thing that may be said about the choices in advance is that they conform to the law â and that is what licenses attributing the standing plan. The plan is the premise the law is derived from. The warrant for the premise is the conclusion.
The circle is in the warrant, not in the proof. The Lean derives the law from the claim; the claim is asserted, never proved, and nothing in the derivation reaches back. What runs in a circle is Rothbard's licence for asserting it.
This is not an objection from outside. The rule is Rothbard's, the claim is Rothbard's, and so is the exemption.
There is a second thing the same plan has to carry, in a place usually discussed on its own. The law is expected to founder on units: to state it by the size of a supply you seem to need units the agent values equally, and Rothbard denies that anyone ever demonstrates indifference by acting. Here it does not founder. Indifference is assumed nowhere, and the law survives without it. What the size-based wording needs is weaker â only that the plan not care which units, just how many. But that is one more thing the standing plan must already have settled, and Rothbard does not deduce it from the axiom of action. He grounds it in his definition of a supply: units "equally capable of rendering the same service to the actor" (p. 23).
That definition does not reach it, and this is checked rather than argued. Equal serviceability is a fact about the horses; what the wording needs is a fact about the man's plan for them. One stable of two horses, each able to serve any want, carries both a plan that treats them alike and a plan that does not. The stock cannot settle it, because the plan is a separate thing. Rothbard's other half â that the man "must have valued each horse or each cow identically" (p. 23) â would settle it, but he withdraws that on the next page, where interchangeability "does not mean that the concrete units are actually valued equally" (p. 24). Taking it back is what keeps indifference out of the law; the cost is that the definition no longer carries the condition the law's wording needs.
Two demands, then, and the encoding keeps them apart:
The one the law is derived from is a praxeological claim. It rides on the signature of every theorem that uses it. If it is false, the law is false.
The one its wording needs is a hypothesis of one theorem. Where it fails the law says nothing â it is silent, not wrong.
Telling which of the two gave way in a particular case is exactly what an audit like this is for.
None of this makes the law wrong. The machine checked the reasoning: the conclusion follows, and the proof uses only what the statement lists. One question is left, and it is a narrow one â may praxeology help itself to that standing plan?